Abstract
A notorious concept in the history of aesthetics, “disinterest,” has begotten
a host of myths. This paper explores and challenges “The Myth of the Absent
Self ” [MAS], according to which in disinterested experience, “the subject need
not do anything other than dispassionately stare at the object, bringing nothing
of herself to the table other than awareness” (Riggle 2016, p. 4). I argue that the
criticism of disinterest experience grounded in MAS is skewed by two false assumptions:
about the nature of the clarifying, evaluative, and transformative
self-consciousness (which the disinterest critic takes to be at the heart of the profundity
of beauty) and about the nature of the self. By bringing out the falsehood of
these two assumptions, and by clarifying the core commitments of disinterest, the
paper proves that the disinterest critic is in no superior position to the disinterest
advocate regarding the explanation of the profound role of beauty in human life.