Large Language Models, Agency, and Why Speech Acts are Beyond Them (For Now) – A Kantian-Cum-Pragmatist Case

Philosophy and Technology 37 (1):1-24 (2024)
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Abstract

This article sets in with the question whether current or foreseeable transformer-based large language models (LLMs), such as the ones powering OpenAI’s ChatGPT, could be language users in a way comparable to humans. It answers the question negatively, presenting the following argument. Apart from niche uses, to use language means to act. But LLMs are unable to act because they lack intentions. This, in turn, is because they are the wrong kind of being: agents with intentions need to be autonomous organisms while LLMs are heteronomous mechanisms. To conclude, the article argues, based on structural aspects of transformer-based LLMs, that these LLMs have taken a first step away from mechanistic artificiality to autonomous self-constitution, which means that these models are (slowly) moving into a direction that someday might result in non-human, but equally non-artificial agents, thus subverting the time-honored Kantian distinction between organism and mechanism.

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Reto Gubelmann
University of Zürich

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References found in this work

Origins of Objectivity.Tyler Burge - 2010 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
The Language Animal: The Full Shape of the Human Linguistic Capacity.Charles Taylor - 2016 - Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
Speech Acts.J. Searle - 1969 - Foundations of Language 11 (3):433-446.

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