Abstract

In a post-truth era, taking seriously the assertions of political figures and what other people say on the internet strikes many as irrational and gullible. Let us call this reaction the “incredulous reaction.” In this paper, I consider a common response to the targets of the incredulous reaction: excluding them from activities like debate and discounting their beliefs as relevant to our own. This exclusion is motivated by the assumption that those who continue to place epistemic trust in a post-truth society are acting irrationally. I begin with an argument that we can justifiably exclude irrational persons from our epistemic activities. I then present a conflict that emerges when we take the wellbeing of our epistemic community to be an end in and of itself, and not merely a means for pursuing other epistemic goods. I propose that healthy epistemic communities depend on networks of epistemic trust and on ensuring their members are treated with the epistemic respect they deserve. If we were to adopt the development of a healthy epistemic community as a goal, then excluding others may no longer be a justifiable choice.