Moral particularism and transduction

Philosophical Issues 15 (1):44–55 (2005)
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Abstract

Can someone be reasonable or justified in accepting a specific moral judgment not based on the prior acceptance of a general exceptioness moral principle, where acceptance of a general principle might be tacit or implicit and might not be expressible in language? This issue is an instance of a wider issue about direct or transductive inference. Developments in statistical learning theory show that such an inference can be more effective than alternative methods using inductive generalization and so can be reasonable. This result carries over to moral transduction, although it is a difficult empirical issue whether people actually engage in any sort of transduction, including moral transduction.

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Gilbert Harman
Princeton University

Citations of this work

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References found in this work

What we owe to each other.Thomas Scanlon - 1998 - Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
The sources of normativity.Christine M. Korsgaard - 1996 - New York: Cambridge University Press. Edited by Onora O'Neill.
What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas Scanlon - 2002 - Mind 111 (442):323-354.
Moral reasons.Jonathan Dancy - 1993 - Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell.

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