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The moral supervenience thesis is not a conceptual truth
Analysis 73 (1):62-68 (2013)
Abstract
Virtually everyone takes the moral supervenience thesis to be a basic conceptual truth about morality. As a result, if a metaethical theory has difficulties respecting or adequately explaining the supervenience relationship it is deemed to be in big trouble. However, the moral supervenience thesis is a not a conceptual truth (though it may be true) and as such it is not a problem if a metaethical theory cannot respect or explain it.Author's Profile
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Citations of this work
On the (in)significance of Hume’s Law.Samuele Chilovi & Daniel Wodak - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (2):633-653.
Supervenience, Dependence, Disjunction.Lloyd Humberstone - forthcoming - Logic and Logical Philosophy:1.
What is Value? Where Does it Come From? A Philosophical Perspective.Christine Tappolet & Mauro Rossi - 2015 - In Tobias Brosch & David Sander (eds.), The Value Handbook: The Affective Sciences of Values and Valuation. pp. 3-22.
Standing up for supervenience.Bart Streumer - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
Universal practice and universal applicability tests in moral philosophy.Scott Forschler - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (12):3041-3058.
References found in this work
How to prove that some acts are wrong (without using substantive moral premises).Christian Coons - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 155 (1):83-98.
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