VI. Emotional Feelings and Intentionalism

Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 52:105-111 (2003)
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Abstract

Emotions are Janus-faced: their focus may switch from how a person is feeling deep inside her, to the busy world of actions, words, or gestures whose perception currently affects her. The intimate relation between the ‘inside’ and the ‘outside’ seems to call for a redrawing of the traditional distinction of mental states between those that can look out to the world, and those that are, supposedly, irredeemably blind.

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Preface.Anthony Hatzimoysis - 2003 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 52:105-111.

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Author's Profile

Anthony Hatzimoysis
National and Kapodistrian University of Athens

References found in this work

The Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford: Oxford University Press. Edited by John Henry McDowell.
Epistemology and cognition.Alvin I. Goldman - 1986 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

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