Ordinary Devices: Reply to Bringsjord's `Clarifying the Logic of Anti-Computationalism: Reply to Hauser'1

Minds and Machines 10 (1):115-117 (2000)
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Abstract

What Robots Can and Can't Be (hereinafter Robots) is, as Selmer Bringsjord says "intended to be a collection of formal-arguments-that-border-on-proofs for the proposition that in all worlds, at all times, machines can't be minds" (Bringsjord, forthcoming). In his (1994) "Précis of What Robots Can and Can't Be" Bringsjord styles certain of these arguments as proceeding "repeatedly . . . through instantiations of" the "simple schema"

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2004

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10.1023/a:1008317632092

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What Robots Can and Can’t Be.Selmer Bringsjord - 1992 - Dordrecht, Netherland: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Precis of What Robots Can and Can't Be.Selmer Bringsjord - 1994 - Psycholoquy 5 (59).

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