Discussion: Re‐solving irrelevant conjunction with probabilistic independence

Philosophy of Science 71 (4):505-514 (2004)
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Abstract

Naive deductivist accounts of confirmation have the undesirable consequence that if E confirms H, then E also confirms the conjunction H·X, for any X—even if X is completely irrelevant to E and H. Bayesian accounts of confirmation may appear to have the same problem. In a recent article in this journal Fitelson (2002) argued that existing Bayesian attempts to resolve of this problem are inadequate in several important respects. Fitelson then proposes a new‐and‐improved Bayesian account that overcomes the problem of irrelevant conjunction, and does so in a more general setting than past attempts. We will show how to simplify and improve upon Fitelson's solution.

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Author Profiles

Branden Fitelson
Northeastern University
James Hawthorne
University of Oklahoma

Citations of this work

Bayesian Philosophy of Science.Jan Sprenger & Stephan Hartmann - 2019 - Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.
The Problem of Measure Sensitivity Redux.Peter Brössel - 2013 - Philosophy of Science 80 (3):378-397.
Hypothetico‐Deductive Confirmation.Jan Sprenger - 2011 - Philosophy Compass 6 (7):497-508.
On Three Measures of Explanatory Power with Axiomatic Representations.Michael P. Cohen - 2016 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 67 (4):1077-1089.

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References found in this work

Studies in Bayesian Confirmation Theory.Branden Fitelson - 2001 - Dissertation, University of Wisconsin, Madison

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