Knowledge and epistemic necessity

Philosophical Studies 158 (3):493-501 (2012)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Claims of the form 'I know P and it might be that not-P' tend to sound odd. One natural explanation of this oddity is that the conjuncts are semantically incompatible: in its core epistemic use, 'Might P' is true in a speaker's mouth only if the speaker does not know that not-P. In this paper I defend this view against an alternative proposal that has been advocated by Trent Dougherty and Patrick Rysiew and elaborated upon in Jeremy Fantl and Matthew McGrath's recent Knowledge in an Uncertain World

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 92,261

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Erratum to: Knowledge and epistemic necessity.John Hawthorne - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 161 (2):347-347.
Knowledge of possibility and of necessity.Bob Hale - 2003 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 103 (1):1–20.
Epistemic responsibility.J. Angelo Corlett - 2008 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 16 (2):179 – 200.
Analyticity Again.Jerry Fodor & Ernie Lepore - 2006 - In Michael Devitt & Richard Hanley (eds.), The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Language. Malden, Mass.: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 19--114.
Virtue Epistemology and Epistemic Twin Earth.Jesper Kallestrup & Duncan Pritchard - 2011 - European Journal of Philosophy 22 (3):335-357.

Analytics

Added to PP
2012-06-06

Downloads
324 (#63,354)

6 months
5 (#648,432)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

John Hawthorne
Australian Catholic University

Citations of this work

Believing epistemic contradictions.Beddor Bob & Simon Goldstein - 2018 - Review of Symbolic Logic (1):87-114.
Generalized Update Semantics.Simon Goldstein - 2019 - Mind 128 (511):795-835.
Fallibilism and the flexibility of epistemic modals.Charity Anderson - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (3):597-606.
Epistemic modals and credal disagreement.Torfinn Thomesen Huvenes - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (4):987-1011.

View all 12 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

Knowledge and its limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Knowledge in an uncertain world.Jeremy Fantl & Matthew McGrath - 2009 - New York: Oxford University Press. Edited by Matthew McGrath.

Add more references