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Confirmation
In S. Psillos & M. Curd (eds.), The Routledge Companion to the Philosophy of Science. Routledge (2008)
Abstract
Confirmation theory is intended to codify the evidential bearing of observations on hypotheses, characterizing relations of inductive “support” and “countersupport” in full generality. The central task is to understand what it means to say that datum E confirms or supports a hypothesis H when E does not logically entail H.Author Profiles
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Citations of this work
Comparative Probabilities.Jason Konek - 2019 - In Richard Pettigrew & Jonathan Weisberg (eds.), The Open Handbook of Formal Epistemology. PhilPapers Foundation. pp. 267-348.
The Foundations of Epistemic Decision Theory.Jason Konek & Benjamin A. Levinstein - 2019 - Mind 128 (509):69-107.
Is an Increase in Probability Always an Increase in Evidential Support?Artūrs Https://Orcidorg Logins - 2022 - Erkenntnis 87 (3):1231-1255.
Generalized Information Theory Meets Human Cognition: Introducing a Unified Framework to Model Uncertainty and Information Search.Vincenzo Crupi, Jonathan D. Nelson, Björn Meder, Gustavo Cevolani & Katya Tentori - 2018 - Cognitive Science 42 (5):1410-1456.
References found in this work
Why the converse consequence condition cannot be accepted.Luca Moretti - 2003 - Analysis 63 (4):297–300.
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