Minds in Motion and Introspective Minds

Journal of Consciousness Studies 30 (9):129-142 (2023)
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Abstract

Buddhist philosophers provide several toolkits for exploring the relationship between meditation and introspection. Drawing on some of their tools, we explore three models of mind, which offer different ways of thinking about the possibility of introspection: an entirely mindful observer, who introspectively experiences 'pure consciousness'; a thin mind, which avoids appealing to a witness or observer of mental episodes by positing a form of reflexive selfawareness; and a thicker mind, which is active, historically situated, and dependent upon an ecological and social context. We then explore practical and theoretical models of a thicker mind, which suggest that meditation is not simply a matter of representing mental episodes and then using these representations for online behavioural control. Drawing upon these models, we close by proposing that meditation should be understood as a practice of mental cultivation, which requires a more radical reconceptualization of knowing a mind.

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Bryce Huebner
Georgetown University

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References found in this work

A Defense of Inner Awareness: The Memory Argument Revisited.Anna Giustina - 2022 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 13 (2):341-363.
Knowing things and going places.Quill R. Kukla - 2022 - European Journal of Philosophy 31 (1):266-282.
Toward an understanding of non-dual mindfulness.John Dunne - 2011 - Contemporary Buddhism 12 (1):71-88.
Knowing things and going places.Quill R. Kukla - 2022 - European Journal of Philosophy 31 (1):266-282.
Taking non‐conceptualism back to Dharmakīrti.Amit Chaturvedi - 2022 - European Journal of Philosophy 31 (1):3-29.

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