Replication and the Establishment of Scientific Truth

Frontiers in Psychology 11 (2020)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

The idea of replication is based on the premise that there are permanent laws to be replicated and verified, and the scientific method is adequate for doing so. Scientific truth, however, is not absolute but relative to time and context, and the method used. Time and context are inextricably interwoven, in that time creates different contexts and contexts (e.g., Christmas Day vs. New Year’s Day) create different experiences of time, rendering psychological phenomena inherently variable. This means that internal and external conditions fluctuate and are different in a replication study vs. the original. Thus, a replication experiment is just another empirical investigation that has no special status in the establishment of scientific truth. It is not the final arbiter of whether or not something exists. In their pursuit of homogeneous external conditions, replications have ignored the homogeneity of internal conditions. There is not a single replication reported in the literature that would have shown participants’ feelings and thoughts—both conscious and nonconscious—to be identical to those of the original participants. Experimental instructions can create varying ratios of conscious over nonconscious processing from one study to another. Ironically, every replication is a failure at the fundamentals of human psychology. While patterns can be discovered, they are not permanent or unchangeable laws of human behavior to be proven by the pinpoint statistical verification through replication. As scientific knowledge in physics is temporary and incomplete, should it be any surprise that science can only provide “temporary winners” for psychological knowledge of human behavior?

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 92,227

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Replication without replicators.Bence Nanay - 2011 - Synthese 179 (3):455-477.
Replicability and replication in the humanities.Rik Peels - 2019 - Research Integrity and Peer Review 4 (1).
Why Replication is Overrated.Uljana Feest - 2019 - Philosophy of Science 86 (5):895-905.
Truth and Scientific Change.Gila Sher - 2017 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 48 (3):371-394.
Towards a Theory of Partial Truth.Jean-Pierre Marquis - 1988 - Dissertation, Mcgill University (Canada)
Refleksi tentang Kebenaran Ilmu.Imam Wahyudi - 2007 - Jurnal Filsafat 14 (3):254-261.
Scientific Realism. [REVIEW]Brian Ellis - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (2):495-497.
Realism and Theories of Truth.Jamin Asay - 2018 - In Juha Saatsi (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Scientific Realism. London: Routledge. pp. 383-393.
Political truth`s implicativity in the contemporary scientific-methodological environment.A. Tretayk - 2017 - Epistemological studies in Philosophy, Social and Political Sciences 37 (3):74-81.

Analytics

Added to PP
2020-09-16

Downloads
11 (#1,142,538)

6 months
5 (#648,432)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

Questionable metascience practices.Mark Rubin - 2023 - Journal of Trial and Error 1.

Add more citations

References found in this work

The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.Thomas S. Kuhn - 1962 - Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Edited by Ian Hacking.
Thinking, Fast and Slow.Daniel Kahneman - 2011 - New York: New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
The Logic of Scientific Discovery.K. Popper - 1959 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 10 (37):55-57.
Experimental and quasi-experimental designs for generalized causal inference.William R. Shadish - 2001 - Boston: Houghton Mifflin. Edited by Thomas D. Cook & Donald Thomas Campbell.

View all 21 references / Add more references