Abstract

This thesis tackles the problem of realism in science by examining the analyses and insights that pluralism and perspectivism might o0fer. Scientific perspectivism was introduced by Giere as a way to use insights from the semantic analysis of theories to strike a middle ground between realism and anti-realism about science, which I discuss in chapter 1. The project here attempts a similar balance in the context of disagreement in specific scientific-historical contexts. It does so by suggesting we think of some forms of disagreement as taxonomic, or identity, disagreements. Scientists use perspectival taxonomies and when problems with a given taxonomy arise, rival “perspectives” emerge. Such problems can be resolved by appeal to trans-perspectival standards of assessment. This approach has the advantage of being sensitive to the historical context in which past theories were used, a virtue that anti-realist views typically have. At the same time, perspectivism does not fall into an anti-realist attitude toward science because it is compatible with stronger realist commitments to the interpretation of scientific theories. To make this argument, I first discuss how data and data-to-phenomena inferences depend upon perspectival taxonomy and hence cannot always be used unambiguously to resolve disagreements. I next articulate the perspectival view, defend it, and situate it within the literature on scientific pluralism in chapter 3. Chapter 4 provides a perspectival interpretation of a paradigmatic case of historical disagreement: the Chemical Revolution and the debate between Lavoisier and Priestley on oxygen and phlogiston. In chapter 5 I distinguish and defend my own view against two influential alternatives that also aspire to provide insightful analyses of disagreement in science.