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Experiential Pluralism and the Power of Perception
In John Collins & Tamara Dobler (eds.), The Philosophy of Charles Travis, Language, Thought, and Perception. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. pp. 222-236 (2018)
Abstract
Sight is a capacity, and seeing is its exercise. Reflection on the sense in which sight is for the sake of seeing reveals distinct relations of dependence between sight and seeing, the capacity and its exercise. Moreover, these relations of dependence in turn reveal the nature of our perceptual capacities and their exercise. Specifically, if sight is for the sake of seeing, then sight will depend, in a certain sense, upon seeing, in a manner inconsistent with experiential monism. Thus reflection on the power of perception forms the basis of an argument for experiential pluralism.Author's Profile
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Citations of this work
Perceptual capacities, discrimination, and the senses.William Hornett - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):14063-14085.
Experiential Pluralism and Mental Kinds.Maja Spener - forthcoming - In Heather Logue & Louise Richardson (eds.), Purpose and Procedure in Philosophy of Perception.
From the agent’s point of view: the case against disjunctivism about rationalisation.Edgar Phillips - 2021 - Philosophical Explorations 24 (2):262-280.
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