Realism and Perceptual Appearance

Abstract

In his 1904 letter to G.F. Stout, Cook Wilson distinguishes objective and sub- jective conceptions of appearance, and provides a diagnosis for the modern acceptance of the subjective conception in terms of a confused misdescrip- tion of the objective appearances that perceptual experience affords. More- over, Cook Wilson links subjective appearances with idealism, the suggestion being that perceptual appearances must be objective if they are to afford us with something akin to proof of a world without the mind.

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Mark Eli Kalderon
University College London

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References found in this work

Some remarks about the senses.H. P. Grice - 1962 - In R. J. Butler (ed.), Analytical Philosophy, First Series. Oxford University Press.
Hinton and the origins of disjunctivism.Paul Snowdon - 2008 - In Adrian Haddock & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Disjunctivism: perception, action, knowledge. Oxford University Press. pp. 35--56.
The Sense-Datum Fallacy.H. A. Prighard - 1938 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 17 (1):1-18.

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