Theodore de Laguna's discovery of the deflationary theory of truth

British Journal for the History of Philosophy 27 (5):1025-1033 (2019)
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Abstract

Theodore de Laguna develops and argues for a deflationary view of truth well before the publication of what many have taken to be its source, or at least its inspiration, namely Frank P. Ramsey’s paper ‘Facts and Propositions’. I outline de Laguna’s view of truth and the arguments he offers for it; I also discuss its role in the history of twentieth-century philosophy. My outline and discussion serve as an introduction to de Laguna’s ‘A Nominalistic Interpretation of Truth’, a paper he originally wrote in English but which has hitherto only been published in French.

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Joel Katzav
University of Queensland

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References found in this work

Facts and Propositions.Frank P. Ramsey - 1927 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 7 (1):153-170.
Cambridge Pragmatism: From Peirce and James to Ramsey and Wittgenstein.Cheryl J. Misak - 2016 - Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press UK.
VI.—Symposium: “Facts and Propositions.”.F. P. Ramsey & G. E. Moore - 1927 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 7 (1):153-206.
Truth.P. F. Strawson - 1948 - Analysis 9 (6):83-97.
Truth.P. F. Strawson - 1950 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 15 (3):215-215.

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