The Injustice of Discrimination

South African Journal of Philosophy 32 (1):47-59 (2013)
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Abstract

Discrimination might be considered unjust on account of the comparative disadvantage it imposes, the absolute disadvantage it imposes, the disrespect it shows, or the prejudice it shows. This article argues that each of these accounts overlooks some cases of unjust discrimination. In response to this state of affairs we might combine two or more of these accounts. A promising approach combines the comparative disadvantage and absolute disadvantage accounts.

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Author's Profile

Carl Knight
University of Glasgow

References found in this work

Moral dimensions: permissibility, meaning, blame.Thomas Scanlon - 2008 - Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Taking rights seriously.Ronald Dworkin (ed.) - 1977 - London: Duckworth.
Equality and equal opportunity for welfare.Richard J. Arneson - 1989 - Philosophical Studies 56 (1):77 - 93.
Equality and priority.Derek Parfit - 1997 - Ratio 10 (3):202–221.
Taking Rights Seriously.Ronald Dworkin - 1979 - Ethics 90 (1):121-130.

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