Identity, indiscernibility, and philosophical claims

Axiomathes 15 (2):191-210 (2005)
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Abstract

The concept of indiscernibility in a structure is analysed with the aim of emphasizing that in asserting that two objects are indiscernible, it is useful to consider these objects as members of (the domain of) a structure. A case for this usefulness is presented by examining the consequences of this view to the philosophical discussion on identity and indiscernibility in quantum theory.

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Author Profiles

Décio Krause
Federal University of Santa Catarina
Antonio Coelho
Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais

References found in this work

Philosophy of Mathematics and Natural Science.Hermann Weyl - 1949 - Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. Edited by Olaf Helmer-Hirschberg & Frank Wilczek.
Introduction to mathematical logic.Alonzo Church - 1944 - Princeton,: Princeton University Press. Edited by C. Truesdell.
Set theory and the continuum hypothesis.Paul J. Cohen - 1966 - New York,: W. A. Benjamin.

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