The intelligent reflex

Philosophical Psychology 32 (5):822-830 (2019)
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Abstract

ABSTRACTThe seeming distinction between motor and cognitive skills has hinged on the fact that the former are automatic and non-propositional, whereas the latter are slow and deliberative. Here, the physiological and behavioral phenomenon of long-latency stretch reflexes is used to show that “knowing-that” can be incorporated into “knowing-how,” either immediately or through learning. The experimental demonstration that slow computations can, with practice, be cached for fast retrieval, without the need for re-computation, dissolves the intellectualist/anti-intellectualist distinction: All complex human tasks, at any level of expertise, are a combination of intelligent reflexes and deliberative decisions.

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Citations of this work

Intelligence Socialism.Carlotta Pavese - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Mind.
Knowledge How.Jeremy Fantl - 2012 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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References found in this work

Practical Senses.Carlotta Pavese - 2015 - Philosophers' Imprint 15.
The psychological reality of practical representation.Carlotta Pavese - 2019 - Philosophical Psychology 32 (5):784-821.
Methodology and the nature of knowing how.Michael Devitt - 2011 - Journal of Philosophy 108 (4):205-218.
Consciousness, context, and know-how.Charles Wallis - 2008 - Synthese 160 (1):123 - 153.

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