Knowing Moral Truth: A Theory of Metaethics and Moral Knowledge

Lanham: Lexington Books (2017)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

This book is staunchly anti-skeptical. It develops a theory of moral realism—there are indeed objective moral truths—and a broadly commonsense theory of moral knowledge: although we are certainly liable to error, we nevertheless often possess moral knowledge.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 92,323

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Knowing that, knowing how, and knowing to do.Refeng Tang - 2011 - Frontiers of Philosophy in China 6 (3):426-442.
Moral skepticism.David Copp - 1991 - Philosophical Studies 62 (3):203 - 233.
A hard look at moral perception.David Faraci - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (8):2055-2072.
Moral Error Theory and the Belief Problem.Jussi Suikkanen - 2013 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics: Volume 8. Oxford University Press. pp. 168-194.
Moral knowledge by perception.Sarah McGrath - 2004 - Philosophical Perspectives 18 (1):209–228.
An Amoral Manifesto Part I.Joel Marks - 2010 - Philosophy Now (80):30-33.
An Amoral Manifesto Part II.Joel Marks - 2010 - Philosophy Now (81):23-26.

Analytics

Added to PP
2017-02-13

Downloads
14 (#995,492)

6 months
2 (#1,206,195)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Christopher Kulp
Santa Clara University

Citations of this work

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references