Bohmian Mechanics is Not Deterministic

Foundations of Physics 52 (4):1-17 (2022)
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Abstract

I argue that Bohmian mechanics cannot reasonably be claimed to be a deterministic theory. If one assumes the “quantum equilibrium distribution” provided by the wave function of the universe, Bohmian mechanics requires an external random oracle in order to describe the algorithmic randomness properties of typical outcome sequences of long runs of repeated identical experiments. This oracle lies beyond the scope of Bohmian mechanics, including the impossibility of explaining the randomness property in question from “random” initial conditions. Thus the advantages of Bohmian mechanics over other interpretations of quantum mechanics, if any, must lie at an ontological level, and in its potential to derive the quantum equilibrium distribution and hence the Born rule.

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Klaas Landsman
Radboud University Nijmegen

References found in this work

The Quantum Mechanics of Minds and Worlds.Jeffrey Alan Barrett - 1999 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Interpreting the Quantum World.Jeffrey Bub - 1998 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 49 (4):637-641.

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