Self-ownership and agent-centered options

Social Philosophy and Policy 36 (2):36-50 (2019)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

I argue that agent-centered options to favor and sacrifice one’s own interests are grounded in a particular aspect of self-ownership. Because you own your interests, you are entitled to a say over how they are used. That is, whether those interests count for or against some action is, at least in part, to be determined by your choice. This is not the only plausible argument for agent-centered options. But it has some virtues that other arguments lack.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 92,227

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Are Moral Reasons Morally Overriding?Douglas W. Portmore - 2008 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 11 (4):369-388.
Taking Seriously the Challenges of Agent-Centered Morality.Hye-Ryoung Kang - 2011 - JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL WONKWANG CULTURE 2 (1):43-56.
Moral Status and Agent-Centred Options.Seth Lazar - 2019 - Utilitas 31 (1):83-105.
Accommodating Options.Seth Lazar - 2018 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 100 (1):233-255.
Other‐Sacrificing Options.Benjamin Lange - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 101 (3):612-629.
Epistemological egoism and agent-centered norms.Michael Huemer - 2011 - In Trent Dougherty (ed.), Evidentialism and its Discontents. Oxford University Press. pp. 17.
A decision maker's options.Paul Weirich - 1983 - Philosophical Studies 44 (2):175 - 186.

Analytics

Added to PP
2021-03-17

Downloads
62 (#261,233)

6 months
24 (#118,043)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Seth Lazar
Australian National University

Citations of this work

Defensive Harm, Consent, and Intervention.Jonathan Parry - 2017 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 45 (4):356-396.
Accommodating Options.Seth Lazar - 2018 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 100 (1):233-255.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Value Receptacles.Richard Yetter Chappell - 2015 - Noûs 49 (2):322-332.
Killing in self‐defense.Jonathan Quong - 2009 - Ethics 119 (3):507-537.
Selflessness and the loss of self.Jean Hampton - 1993 - Social Philosophy and Policy 10 (1):135-65.

View all 12 references / Add more references