Abstract
The attack of Pierre-Daniel Huet on Cartesianism at the end of the seventeenth century was one of the most significant events in the history of skepticism in the early modern period. It capitalized on the building momentum generated by the use of skeptical arguments throughout the century, and it opened the way to the anti-metaphysical stance of the Enlightenment, beginning with Bayle and passing to the philosophes, including Hume. The inevitable Cartesian response to Huet came from Pierre-Sylvain Regis, to whom Huet then responded in various ways. Although Huet’s attack had taken aim at all the themes with which Cartesianism has come to be associated (the method of doubt, the cogito, clarity and distinctness of perception, etc.), and although Regis replied on all these topics, the debate between them concentrated on Cartesian doubt, here closely examined in light of their debate.