In
Wittgenstein. Chichester, UK: Wiley. pp. 88–124 (
2015)
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Abstract
Wittgenstein has a role for pointing out with grammar. Pointing is available as a potential resource in justifying and explaining grammar, the regular use of words. This chapter explores some of the foundational issues that frame the idea that pointing can play this role. It concentrates on the role of pointing in justifying the use of words and provides the beginnings of an account of how Wittgenstein's discussion in the opening sections of Philosophical Investigations can be integrated with on‐going philosophical enquiry. The autonomy of grammar is a metaphysical thesis. Wittgenstein has a role for pointing that can contribute to an explanation and justification of linguistic regularities. The idea of grammar as linguistic regularity cuts across the received mythology of grammar as a body of norms, norms for the use of words. The idea of philosophical explanation surviving as an enterprise in Wittgenstein's work is contentious.