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Does functionalism really deal with the phenomenal side of experience?
Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (5):993-994 (2001)
Abstract
Sensory motor contingencies belong to a functionalistic framework. Functionalism does not explain why and how objective functional relations produce phenomenal experience. O'Regan & Noë (O&N) as well as other functionalists do not propose a new ontology that could support the first person subjective phenomenal side of experience.Author's Profile
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Citations of this work
Embodied AI beyond Embodied Cognition and Enactivism.Riccardo Manzotti - 2019 - Philosophies 4 (3):39.
Varieties of consciousness.Paolo Bartolomeo & Gianfranco Dalla Barba - 2002 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (3):331-332.
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