Concepts

In Stephen P. Stich & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell. pp. 190-213 (2003)
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Abstract

This article provides a critical overview of competing theories of conceptual structure (definitional structure, probabilistic structure, theory structure), including the view that concepts have no structure (atomism). We argue that the explanatory demands that these different theories answer to are best accommodated by an organization in which concepts are taken to have atomic cores that are linked to differing types of conceptual structure.

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Author Profiles

Eric Margolis
University of British Columbia
Stephen Laurence
University of Sheffield

Citations of this work

Minimal phenomenal experience.Thomas Metzinger - 2020 - Philosophy and the Mind Sciences 1 (I):1-44.
Know-how as Competence. A Rylean Responsibilist Account.David Löwenstein - 2017 - Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann.
Objective Phenomenology.Andrew Y. Lee - 2024 - Erkenntnis 89 (3):1197–1216.

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References found in this work

Philosophical Investigations.Ludwig Wittgenstein - 1953 - New York, NY, USA: Wiley-Blackwell. Edited by G. E. M. Anscombe.
Two Dogmas of Empiricism.W. Quine - 1951 - [Longmans, Green].
The meaning of 'meaning'.Hilary Putnam - 1975 - Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 7:131-193.
Two Dogmas of Empiricism.Willard V. O. Quine - 1951 - Philosophical Review 60 (1):20–43.

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