Disagreement

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Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2018)
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Abstract

This article examines the central epistemological issues tied to the recognition of disagreement.

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Author Profiles

Jonathan Matheson
University of North Florida
Bryan Frances

Citations of this work

How to endorse conciliationism.Will Fleisher - 2021 - Synthese 198 (10):9913-9939.
Pursuit and inquisitive reasons.Will Fleisher - 2022 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 94 (C):17-30.
Would Disagreement Undermine Progress?Finnur Dellsén, Insa Lawler & James Norton - 2023 - Journal of Philosophy 120 (3):139-172.

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References found in this work

Being Realistic About Reasons.Thomas Scanlon - 2014 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
The epistemic significance of disagreement.Thomas Kelly - 2019 - In Jeremy Fantl, Matthew McGrath & Ernest Sosa (eds.), Contemporary epistemology: an anthology. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley. pp. 167-196.
Epistemology of disagreement: The good news.David Christensen - 2007 - Philosophical Review 116 (2):187-217.
Warranted Christian Belief.Alvin Plantinga - 2000 - New York, US: Oxford University Press USA.
Reflection and disagreement.Adam Elga - 2007 - Noûs 41 (3):478–502.

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