A Reply to S Siddharth’s ‘Against Phenomenal Bonding’

European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 18 (1):(D1)5-18 (2022)
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Abstract

In this journal S Siddharth has recently argued that the phenomenal bonding response to the subject summing argument for panpsychism is question begging, therefore we should reject constitutive forms of panpsychism. The argument specifically focuses on the proposals of Goff and Miller. In this reply, I show that the argument is unsound.

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Gregory Miller
University of Liverpool

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