Wrongful Rational Persuasion Online

Philosophy and Technology 37 (1):1-25 (2024)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

In this article, we argue that rational persuasion can be a _pro tanto_ wrong and that online platforms possess features that are especially conducive to this wrong. We begin by setting out an account of rational persuasion. This consists of four jointly sufficient conditions for rational persuasion and is intended to capture the core, uncontroversial cases of such persuasion. We then discuss a series of wrong-making features which are present in methods of influence commonly thought of as _pro tanto_ wrong, such as manipulation and paternalism. It is next shown that these wrong-making features are also present in a range of cases that are, by the jointly sufficient conditions already established, rational persuasion, and so some forms of rational persuasion are _pro tanto_ wrong, including in some ways that have not previously been remarked upon. Finally, we demonstrate that online settings possess a number of features that are especially conducive to wrongful rational persuasion.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 92,197

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Argumentation as Rational Persuasion.J. Anthony Blair - 2012 - Argumentation 26 (1):71-81.
Persuasion dialogue in online dispute resolution.Douglas Walton & David M. Godden - 2005 - Artificial Intelligence and Law 13 (2):273-295.
Reasons.Larry Wright - 2019 - Topoi 38 (4):751-762.
Reasons.Larry Wright - 2019 - Topoi 38 (4):751-762.
Rational Persuasion as Paternalism.George Tsai - 2014 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 42 (1):78-112.

Analytics

Added to PP
2024-02-22

Downloads
33 (#486,491)

6 months
33 (#103,502)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Thomas Douglas
University of Oxford

Citations of this work

Add more citations

References found in this work

What we owe to each other.Thomas Scanlon - 1998 - Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Practical Reality.Jonathan Dancy - 2000 - Philosophy 78 (305):414-425.
The Theory and Practice of Autonomy.Gerald Dworkin - 1988 - Philosophy 64 (250):571-572.
Hard Choices.Ruth Chang - 2017 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 3 (1):1-21.

View all 32 references / Add more references