Anti‐Atomism about Color Representation

Noûs 47 (2):94-122 (2013)
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Abstract

According to anti-atomism, we represent color properties (e.g., red) in virtue of representing color relations (e.g., redder than). I motivate anti-atomism with a puzzle involving a series of pairwise indistinguishable chips. I then develop two versions of anti-atomism

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John Morrison
Barnard College

Citations of this work

Colour Relations in Form.Will Davies - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 102 (3):574-594.
Quality-Space Functionalism about Color.Jacob Berger - 2021 - Journal of Philosophy 118 (3):138-164.

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References found in this work

Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Philosophy 76 (297):460-464.
Troubles with functionalism.Ned Block - 1978 - Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 9:261-325.
Mind and World.Huw Price & John McDowell - 1994 - Philosophical Books 38 (3):169-181.
Vagueness, truth and logic.Kit Fine - 1975 - Synthese 30 (3-4):265-300.

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