Abstract

My dissertation urges a reconsideration of Plutarch’s importance as a philosopher. Plutarch is well known for his biographies and as a source for other authors, but not for original views of his own. A study that attempts to understand Plutarch sympathetically is surprisingly untried. Far from the uncharitable perception of Plutarch as a mere eclectic disseminator of popular philosophy, Plutarch offers a distinctive and appealing ethical view, neglected in the history of philosophy, which affirms the centrality of our passions in ethical development and their essential place in the good life. It is a refreshing alternative to the overly rationalistic tradition of Stoicism, the main philosophical rival of Plutarch’s day. It is also different from other forms of Platonism. It does not ask us to abandon familiar, positive features of our emotional life and intimacy with others, unlike the otherworldly Platonisms we often find later in antiquity. I explore the centrality of passions in Plutarch’s moral philosophy primarily through the close reading of his ethical writings, the Moralia, vis-à-vis Plato’s dialogues, the traditions spawned from Plato’s Academy, and rival philosophical schools. In the Introduction to my dissertation, I begin with Plutarch’s presentation of himself as part of the continuing tradition of Plato’s Academy, a living tradition for Plutarch that is united, from Socrates to his own day, by a commitment to critical reflection rather than by a commitment to a set of dogmas or doctrines. Given this view of Plato’s Academy, Plutarch takes a distinctive position in holding that emotions and emotional vulnerability are essential to social virtues and genuine concern for other individuals, in contrast with Stoicism. I take up this point in Chapter 1 of my dissertation, where I examine Plutarch’s criticisms of the rival ethical theory of Stoic “appropriation” or “identification” (oikeiōsis) which Plutarch argues ironically alienates us from our own human nature and from other human beings. In Chapter 2, I explore Plutarch’s Platonic psychology and analyze his arguments on the appropriateness and naturalness of grief. Plutarch’s position that passions should be moderated and serve specific purposes sits in contrast with the advice to minimize and eradicate emotions such as grief as far as one is able in Plato’s Republic. In Chapter 3, I show that for Plutarch passions are not only ineradicable aspects of embodied life, but are also necessary for acting in the world, can enhance and intensify virtuous action, and can aid in the pursuit of virtue. Life with passions is better than without them. Chapter 4 is an examination of the positive role that shame plays in correcting one’s actions and character in Plutarch’s moral psychology. In Chapter 5, I turn to the prominent role emotions play in the formation of character. In contrast to the Old Academy, Plutarch argues that the most important preparation for the virtuous life begins with the formation of our passionate nature in childhood. In Chapter 6, I argue that Plutarch provides an alternative theory of moral development to the Stoic theory of oikeiōsis, placing the passion of affection at the heart of our social development. Affection serves as the seed, as it were, of our ever-expanding sense of identification with others. As we attempt to fulfill our nature in imitation of the divine (homoiōsis theōi), we cultivate divine qualities while remaining fully human with passions.