Personal Identity: A Defence of Locke

Philosophy 50 (192):169 - 187 (1975)
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Abstract

The theory of personal identity should illuminate and be illuminated by the theory of personality, of which it is a part. I believe that Locke's theory succeeds in this more than that of any other great philosopher, and the modifications which it may need are not fundamental ones. The problems raised by Butler and Flew can be made to disappear.

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Citations of this work

Locke on Persons and Personal Identity.Ruth Boeker - 2021 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Locke's Theory of Personal Identity.Paul Helm - 1979 - Philosophy 54 (208):173 - 185.

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References found in this work

Personal identity.Derek Parfit - 1971 - Philosophical Review 80 (January):3-27.
Identity and Spatio-Temporal Continuity.David Wiggins - 1967 - Philosophy 43 (165):298-299.
Locke and the Problem of Personal Identity.Antony Flew - 1951 - Philosophy 26 (96):53 - 68.
Survival and Disembodied Existence.Terence Penelhum - 1970 - Philosophy 46 (176):176-178.
Memory and personal identity.A. B. Palma - 1964 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 42 (1):53-68.

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