What is the economic concept of choice? An experimental philosophy study

Economics and Philosophy 35 (3):461-478 (2019)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Economists and philosophers disagree about the concept of choice used in economics. Some behavioural economists argue that economic models of choice will improve as they become more and more psychologically realistic. Don Ross argues that this argument fails because its hidden assumption – that the economic concept of choice is the same as the psychological counterpart – is false. Ross conjectures that the economic concept of choice concerns a population-scale pattern of behavioural changes in response to incentives. We conduct a survey experiment to test two predictions that Ross’s conjecture generates. The statistical analysis of our data confirms our predictions, although with some qualifications. In interpreting our results, we distinguish two versions of commonsensible realism, strong and weak, and propose the weak one as a plausible explanation of our results. Weak commonsensible realism also produces further testable hypotheses. Some methodological implications of our study are discussed.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 92,227

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Experimental Philosophy of Economics.Michiru Nagatsu - 2013 - Economics and Philosophy 29 (2):263-76.
Neuroscience, Choice, and the Free Will Debate.Jason Shepard & Shane Reuter - 2012 - American Journal of Bioethics - Neuroscience 3 (3):7-11.
Freedom and choice in economics.Adolfo García de la Sienra - 2016 - Journal of Economic Methodology 23 (3):316-332.
Rational choice theory and economic laws: The role of shared values.Amparo Gómez Rodríguez - 2008 - Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 96 (1):191-205.
Calcul sau Credinta? Aplicatii ale teoriei alegerii rationale in studiul religiei.Mihnea Vasilescu - 2002 - Journal for the Study of Religions and Ideologies 1 (2):183-193.

Analytics

Added to PP
2019-10-18

Downloads
53 (#302,321)

6 months
13 (#199,525)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Michiru Nagatsu
University of Helsinki

References found in this work

Preferences: neither behavioural nor mental.Francesco Guala - 2019 - Economics and Philosophy 35 (3):383-401.
What Preferences Really Are.Erik Angner - 2018 - Philosophy of Science 85 (4):660-681.
Experimental philosophy of science.Paul E. Griffiths & Karola Stotz - 2008 - Philosophy Compass 3 (3):507–521.

View all 10 references / Add more references