What shall we do with verisimilitude?

Philosophy of Science 49 (2):181-197 (1982)
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Abstract

Popper distinguishes the problems of theoretical and pragmatic preference between rival theories, but he claims that there is a common non-inductive solution to both of them, viz. the "best-tested theory", or the theory with the highest degree of corroboration. He further suggests that the degrees of corroboration serve as indicators of verisimilitude. One may therefore raise the question whether the recent theory of verisimilitude gives a general non-inductive solution to the problem of theoretical preference. This paper argues that this is not the case: the theory of verisimilitude is applicable to this problem if and only if there is an independent solution to the problem of induction. Moreover, the solutions to the theoretical and pragmatic problems of preference coincide only in some special cases.

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Ilkka Niiniluoto
University of Helsinki

Citations of this work

Why It Is Time To Move Beyond Nagelian Reduction.Marie I. Kaiser - 2012 - In D. Dieks, W. J. Gonzalez, S. Hartmann, M. Stöltzner & M. Weber (eds.), Probabilities, Laws, and Structures. The Philosophy of Science in a European Perspective. Heidelberg, GER: Springer. pp. 255-272.
Truthlikeness and bayesian estimation.Ilkka Niiniluoto - 1986 - Synthese 67 (2):321 - 346.
Estimation and error free information.Isaac Levi - 1986 - Synthese 67 (2):347 - 360.
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References found in this work

A confutation of convergent realism.Larry Laudan - 1981 - Philosophy of Science 48 (1):19-49.
A Confutation of Convergent Realism.Larry Laudan - 1980 - In Yuri Balashov & Alexander Rosenberg (eds.), Philosophy of Science: Contemporary Readings. Routledge. pp. 211.
Scientific progress.Ilkka Niiniluoto - 1980 - Synthese 45 (3):427 - 462.
Verisimilitude revisited.Pavel Tichý - 1978 - Synthese 38 (2):175 - 196.
Verisimilitude reviewed.Graham Oddie - 1981 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 32 (3):237-265.

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