Colivan Commitment, vis-à-vis Moore’s Paradox

Philosophia 47 (2):323-333 (2019)
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Abstract

This is a contribution to a symposium on Annalisa Coliva's book _The Varieties of Self-Knowledge_. I present her notion of a "commitment" and how it is used in her treatment of Moore paradoxical assertions and thoughts (e.g., "I believe that it is raining, but it is not;" "It is raining but I do not believe that it is"). The final section notes the points of convergence between her constitutivism about self-knowledge of commitments, and the constitutivism from my book _Self-Reflection for the Opaque Mind_.

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10.1007/s11406-018-0005-7

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T. Parent
Nazarbayev University

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Blindspots.Roy A. Sorensen - 1988 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Blindspots.Roy Sorensen - 1990 - Mind 99 (393):137-140.
Blindspots.Michael Levin - 1991 - Noûs 25 (3):389-392.

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