The Nonconceptual Contents of our Minds

ProtoSociology 22:78-98 (2006)
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Abstract

The aim of this paper is to review the controversy concerning the nature of nonconceptual content, and its philosophical implications. I will focus the presentation on three topics: (a) the different motivations behind the postulation of nonconceptual content, (b) the arguments for nonconceptual content, and (c) the different characterizations offered of nonconceptual content (and the problem these definitions pose). In the last section of the paper I will mention the presuppositions behind this notion and analyze a couple of paradoxical theses that emerged from this discussion.

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Author's Profile

Diana I. Pérez
Universidad de Buenos Aires (UBA)

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