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Hypnosis and the death of "subjective backwards referral"
Consciousness and Cognition 13 (3):621-25 (2004)
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Citations of this work
Does 'hypnosis' by any other name smell as sweet? The efficacy of 'hypnotic' inductions depends on the label 'hypnosis'.Balaganesh Gandhi & David A. Oakley - 2005 - Consciousness and Cognition 14 (2):304-315.
The timing of brain events: Reply to the “Special Section” in this journal of September 2004, edited by Susan Pockett.Benjamin Libet - 2006 - Consciousness and Cognition 15 (3):540-547.
The timing of brain events: Authors’ response to Libet’s ‘Reply’.David A. Oakley & Patrick Haggard - 2006 - Consciousness and Cognition 15 (3):548-550.
Recovering from Libet's Left Turn into Veto-as-Volition: A Proposal for Dealing Honestly with the Central Mystery of Libet (1983).Conal Boyce - 2012 - Open Journal of Philosophy 2 (1):17-24.
References found in this work
Voluntary action and conscious awareness.Patrick Haggard, Sam Clark & Jeri Kalogeras - 2002 - Nature Neuroscience 5 (4):382-385.
The timing of conscious experience: A critical review and reinterpretation of Libet's research.Gilberto Gomes - 1998 - Consciousness and Cognition 7 (4):559-595.
On subjective back-referral and how long it takes to become conscious of a stimulus: A reinterpretation of Libet's data.Susan Pockett - 2002 - Consciousness and Cognition 11 (2):141-61.
Anomalous control: When "free will" is not conscious.Patrick Haggard, Peter Cartledge, Meilyr Dafydd & David A. Oakley - 2004 - Consciousness and Cognition 13 (3):646-654.
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