Abstract

It is common to think of warfare as a setting in which emotion can lead combatants to engage in unethical behavior. On this view, it is natural to conceptualize the aim of military ethics training as quelling the influence of emotion in combat in order to reduce the risk that military personnel are vulnerable to its influence. Recent research, however, indicates that what is called “emotion processing” is connected in important ways with moral judgment and behavior. In this view, acting ethically is not simply a matter of subordinating emotion to reason, but of responding with appropriate rather than inappropriate emotion. In this respect, such research challenges the powerful “rationalist” account of moral judgment and behavior. More fundamentally, it calls into question the distinction between reason and emotion as a way to understand our moral sensibilities. This article describes this research and discusses work on naturalistic decision-making and neuroscience that provide support for its insights. It then suggests ways in which such research is consistent with Aristotelian notions of character and virtue. Finally, it identifies ways in which some military training implicitly draws on lessons from this body of research, and suggests how it might do so more deliberately.