Abstract

The most important epistemological problem in psychiatry is the detection of malingering. This is a consequence of the fact that there is no objective way to confirm any psychiatric diagnosis. Psychiatric diagnosis is based on subjective complaints. The discovery of objective markers for psychiatric diagnosis is problematic because it presupposes we can tell valid from faked subjective symptoms. But this is the difficulty. If we use pervasive irrationality as a sign of mental illness, we encounter the problem of identifying pervasive irrationality. To understand someone's behaviour, we have to assume it is largely rational. This precludes us from using behaviour to separate genuine from faked mental illness. There are a number of strategies used to solve any epistemological problem, and the most successful is the hypothetico-deductive method. If we use this, we can solve our epistemological problem. Genuine mental illness can be identified when it is the best explanation of the person's overall behaviour. Consilience of inductions is critical in supporting the validity of such explanations. This implies that it is merely a hypothesis that mental illness exists, and that we might discover that many mental illnesses, perhaps all, do not exist. We must embrace this possibility - only if we take a risk will we gain any knowledge