Knowing What One Believes – In Defense of a Dispositional Reliabilist Extrospective Account

American Philosophical Quarterly 53 (4):365-379 (2016)
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Abstract

We seem to enjoy a special kind of access to our beliefs. We seem able to know about them via a distinctively first-personal method, and such knowledge seems epistemically superior to any knowledge that others might attain of our beliefs. This paper defends a novel account of this access. The account is extrospective in that it explains this access in terms of our ability to think about the (non-mental) world. Moreover, it does not require the contentious claim that judging that p suffices for coming to believe that p. This is a significant strength of the account.

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Michael Roche
Idaho State University

Citations of this work

Introspection.Eric Schwitzgebel - 2010 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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References found in this work

The Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford: Oxford University Press. Edited by John Henry McDowell.
Consciousness and Experience.William G. Lycan - 1996 - Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
The content and epistemology of phenomenal belief.David Chalmers - 2002 - In Aleksandar Jokic & Quentin Smith (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 220--72.
Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2003 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (210):105-116.

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