Abstract

This paper’s focus is about some questions concerning the ontology of the angel and the theory of knowledge. About ontology, the main problems discussed by Albert are the metaphysical composition (despite its immateriality) of the angel, the nature of angel’s individuality and the angel’s relationship with the separate intelligences. On this last point Albert, unlike Thomas, argues that angels and intelligences are distinct entities and that the identification between them would be a denial of angel’s ministerial function. In order to accomplish this function, angels must know not only God’s essence, the first object of their contemplation, but also particular things and events of human lives. This is one of the reasons why Albert considers the mind of the angel through a close comparison with the characteristics of the divine mind on the one hand, and with the human mind on the other. The angel, unlike man, is an immaterial entity, devoid of sense organs: in the terms of Aristotelian gnoseology valid for man, it is not clear how angel can know particular things. In order to resolve this difficulty, Albert hints at a cognitive mechanism per applicationem of the innate form of the thing. The angelic mind therefore appears to Albert as characterized, unlike God, by only habitual knowledge of things, which becomes in actu only after a “contact” with the things themselves.