"Moral Sentiment and the Rationale of Responsibility"

Dissertation, Cambridge University (1986)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

This thesis defends a naturalistic interpretation, and offers a critical analysis, of the views of David Hume on the subject of free will and moral responsibility. A central theme is that Hume's views should be understood and assessed in relation to P.F. Strawson's influential paper "Freedom and Resentment" (1962). The work in this thesis lays the foundation for "Freedom and Moral Sentiment: Hume's Way of Naturalizing Responsibility" (Oxford University Press: 1995)

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 92,227

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Free Will and Moral Sense: Strawsonian Approaches.Paul Russell - 2017 - In Kevin Timpe, Meghan Griffith & Neil Levy (eds.), Routledge Companion to Free Will. New York: Routledge. pp. 96-108.
Hume on free will.Paul Russell - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
The Limits of Free Will: Selected Essays.Paul Russell - 2017 - New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
About the Needlessness of the Verb “To Be”.Dan Simbotin - 2008 - Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 15:231-236.
Moral Responsibility.Christopher Cowley - 2013 - Bristol, CT: Routledge.
An Analysis of Semi-Compatibilism.Gan Hun Ahn - 2008 - Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 15:7-12.
A Wittgensteinian Account of Free Will and Moral Responsibility.Stefan Rummens & Benjamin De Mesel - 2023 - In Cecilie Eriksen, Julia Hermann, Neil O'Hara & Nigel Pleasants (eds.), Philosophical perspectives on moral certainty. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 132-155.
Constitutive Moral Luck and Strawson's Argument for the Impossibility of Moral Responsibility.Robert J. Hartman - 2018 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 4 (2):165-183.
(Un)just Deserts: The Dark Side of Moral Responsibility.Gregg D. Caruso - 2014 - Southwest Philosophy Review 30 (1):27-38.

Analytics

Added to PP
2023-09-23

Downloads
10 (#1,198,690)

6 months
9 (#317,143)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Paul Russell
Lund University

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references