Internalizm motywacyjny Richarda M. Hare'a

Analiza I Egzystencja 5:179-202 (2007)
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Abstract

Ethics of Richard M. Hare is widely considered as a classical example of the strong internalistic theory of motivation: he is thought to believe that having a moral motive is a sufficient condition to act accordingly. However, strong internalism has difficulties with explaining the phenomenon of acrasia and amoralism. For this reason some critics charge him with developing a false theory of moral motivation. In the article I present Hare's answer to these questions by dividing the discussion about motivation into three levels: semantical, epistemological, and ontological. I also explain his concept of internal motivation and argue that his theory, contrary to what his critics assume, may be called a weak motivational internalism.

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Krzysztof Saja
Uniwersytet Szczeciński

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References found in this work

The moral problem.Michael Smith - 1994 - Cambridge, Mass., USA: Blackwell.
Freedom and reason.Richard Mervyn Hare - 1963 - Oxford,: Clarendon Press.
Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong.Fred Feldman & J. L. Mackie - 1979 - Philosophical Review 88 (1):134.
Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics.Robert Shaver - 1992 - Philosophical Review 101 (2):458.
Externalist moral realism.David O. Brink - 1986 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 24 (S1):23-41.

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