Abstract

The aim of this dissertation is to present Popper's account of objectivity. To this end, we follow the general chronology of his thought, however our emphasis in our critical exposition is on his confrontation with particular problems in the philosophy of science and the picture of objectivity that results. Popper identifies science as the locus of objectivity. For Popper all knowledge begins as common-sense knowledge and is inherently self-critical. Science is characterized by the refinement of the critical process initiated by human interaction with the world. Thus science is common-sense "Writ Large." Consequently, according to Popper, a thesis is objective to the extent that it's susceptible to intersubjective criticism characteristic of scientific methodology. Therefore, the focus of our account of Popper's treatment of objectivity is his writings in the philosophy of science that directly address issues of scientific methodology. ;Specifically, we treat of the problem of demarcation, the falsifiability of probability statements, Popper's identification of the method of conjecture and refutation with Neo-Darwinian evolution, and lastly the problem of convention in scientific methodology. The dissertation concludes with a general sketch of the picture of objectivity that results from our critical exposition, and a consideration of both possible criticisms of our account and a prospectus of some areas of possible future research