’Liberalism and / or Socialism?’ The Wrong Question?

In Stéphane Guy (ed.), Liberalism and Socialism since the Nineteenth Century: Tensions, Exchanges and Convergences. London: Palgrave (forthcoming)
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Abstract

Political questions are typically framed in normative terms, in terms of the political actions that we (or our political representatives) “ought” to take or, alternatively, in terms of the political philosophies that “should” inform our political actions. “Should we be liberals or socialists, or should we (somehow) combine liberalism and socialism?” Such questions are typically posed and debates around such questions emerge with little, if any, prior consideration of a question that is, logically speaking, more fundamental: “What can we effectively achieve through political action? What goals are within and without the scope of political action?” Because we pose and argue about normative political questions without first getting the descriptive facts straight, we often embark on political projects that have little hope of success. Anyone who accepts a principle like ought implies can is committed to rejecting “ought” claims that assert obligations to do things that cannot be done. Given that most, if not all, people accept some such principle, most, if not all, people are implicitly committed to rejecting the traditional – purely normative – form of political discussion. That they nevertheless engage in such discussion reveals a significant inconsistency in how many people think about and assign obligations to policymakers. If the question “Liberalism and / or Socialism?” is the normative question “Should we be liberals or socialists, or should we (somehow) combine liberalism and socialism?” then it is the wrong – or, more exactly, a premature – question to ask.

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Scott Scheall
Arizona State University

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