A Précis of Intentionality in Sellars: A Transcendental Account of Finite Knowledge

International Journal of Philosophical Studies 30 (5):519-524 (2022)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

The key question I pursue in this book can be captured as follows: How can reference to the world be justified in a non-relational conception of intentionality? The overarching context of this proj...

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 92,227

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Sellars and McDowell on Objectivity.Patrice Philie - 2015 - Kriterion - Journal of Philosophy 29 (3):63-92.
Sellars on Self-Knowledge.Franz Ulrich Knappik - 2019 - In Stefan Brandt & Anke Breunig (eds.), Wilfrid Sellars and Twentieth-Century Philosophy. pp. 221-239.
A Precis of Intentionality and the Myths of the Given.Carl Sachs - 2016 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 24 (4):547-551.
From the Naturalistic to the Transcendental Conception of Intentionality.Zhongwei Li - 2018 - Comparative and Continental Philosophy 10 (1):74-87.
Critique of Wilfrid Sellars' Materialism.Andrew Chrucky - 1990 - Dissertation, Fordham University
Intentionality, Mind, And Language.Ausonio Marras (ed.) - 1972 - London: University Of Illinois Press.
The 'theory theory' of mind and the aims of Sellars' original myth of Jones.James R. O’Shea - 2012 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 11 (2):175-204.
Sellars and the measure of all things.David Kolb - 1978 - Philosophical Studies 34 (4):381 - 400.

Analytics

Added to PP
2023-02-18

Downloads
18 (#836,872)

6 months
5 (#648,432)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

...this I or He or It (The thing) which thinks..Wilfrid Sellars - 1970 - Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 44:5 - 31.

Add more references