How Action Governs Intention

Philosophers' Imprint 8:1-19 (2008)
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Abstract

Why can't deliberation conclude in an intention except by considering whether to perform the intended action? I argue that the answer to this question entails that reasons for intention are determined by reasons for action. Understanding this feature of practical deliberation thus allows us to solve the toxin puzzle.

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