Two Problems for Accepting as Intending

Ethics 128 (3):626-641 (2018)
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Abstract

It’s possible to accept or to reject a promise. According to a new proposal by Abraham Roth, accepting a promise involves intending that the promisee perform the promised action. According to Roth, this view is supported by rational symmetries between promissory acceptance and intention. Here, I show how these symmetries actually generate two problems for the view.

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Author's Profile

Nathaniel Sharadin
University of Hong Kong

Citations of this work

Promises.Allen Habib - 2009 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Promises, obligation, and reliance.Alexander Heape - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 104 (1):150-170.

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References found in this work

Intention, plans, and practical reason.Michael Bratman - 1987 - Cambridge: Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Change in View: Principles of Reasoning.Gilbert Harman - 1986 - Cambridge, MA, USA: MIT Press.
Two faces of intention.Michael Bratman - 1984 - Philosophical Review 93 (3):375-405.
The Realm of Rights.J. J. Thomson - 1990 - Philosophy 66 (258):538-540.

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