Abstract

In “Thinking and Moral Considerations,” Arendt explores whether there is a relationship between thinking and abstention from wrongdoing. Two propositions are used from Plato’s Gorgias to explore the normative dimension of thinking, conceived as internal dialogue between a two-in-one in the mind: that one should not be out of harmony with oneself and that it is better to suffer than do wrong. Arendt attempts to derives the second “moral” proposition from the first, a move which has been seen as weak. This paper offers a new reading of the argument by bringing Arendt into closer dialogue with Plato. The argument is in fact grounded in the importance of plurality and relationality (to the thinking dialogue), and what is required to negotiate it: equality. Wrongdoers show a disdain for equality, and as such they are not collaboration-apt; so, there can be no collaborative dialogue with a wrongdoer. This generates the desired conclusion that if one is to think collaboratively and harmoniously (desired because the two exist in my one person), one should abstain from wrongdoing.