An argument for consequentialism

Philosophical Perspectives 6:399-421 (1992)
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10.2307/2214254

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Citations of this work

Consequentialism.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 2019 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
The Moral Dimensions of Boredom: A call for research.Andreas Elpidorou - 2017 - Review of General Psychology 21 (1):30-48.
Morality and Practical Reasons.Douglas W. Portmore - 2021 - Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press.
“Cannot” implies “not ought”.Frances Howard-Snyder - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 130 (2):233-246.

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